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Preamble: On Subjectivity 
 
Within research traditions, the construct of “subjectivity” is limited and contentious. Subjectivity 
is often associated with the “personal” in ways that enable it to be diminished or reduced. A 
reductive perspective of subjectivity means that it is commonly understood as the realm of 
“personal opinions, assumptions, interpretations, and beliefs” as opposed to the more “objective” 
and, arguably lauded “observation of measurable facts”  
(https://www.diffen.com/difference/Objective_vs_Subjective).  
 
There is an inherent assumption embedded in critiques of subjectivity: if something is measured, 
it is fact; if something is felt, believed, or interpreted, it is not. Qualitative research has been 
criticized for being too personal, too subjective (Greenhalgh et al., 2016). Research that focuses 
on experiences engages interpretation to make meaning of those experiences. Quantitative 
research engages measurement to make meaning of phenomena. Whereas the tools of the quanti-
tative researcher are seen as a more reliable basis for articulation of “facts,” the interpretations of 
the hermeneutic researcher cannot (and should not) be measured in the same way. “The theory 
that everything is a matter of interpretation is called hermeneutics…there are no uninterpreted 
facts of the matter. Every matter of fact is a matter of the interpretation that picks out the facts” 
(Caputo, 2018, pp. 3-4). Where this becomes problematic is that the worth placed on the differ-
ent tools and practices of researchers means they are valued differently. Hermeneutic research is 
easily reduced and dismissed as subjective accounts, and therefore not trustworthy or dependable. 
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Addressing this issue seems to be an ongoing challenge that warrants attention (Moules, Ven-
turato, Laing, & Field, 2017).  
 
Subjectivity is a complex phenomenon and a misused term. The philosophical nuances of 
subjectivity are overlooked and ignored when it is reduced to simply mean “opinion,” or “expe-
rience.” Although subjectivity incorporates both opinion and experience, it is also neither of 
these things. Some philosophical ideas, such as personalism (for e.g.) reveal or suggest that 
subjectivity is, indeed, intersubjectivity because of the relational nature of humans. Subjectivity 
must, then, have an external referent. Can subjectivity qua subjectivity, therefore, ever be 
known? Personalism also further troubles the idea of subjectivity because, to other “people” we 
are also objects. What, then, is the nature and experience of the object-subject?  Although we are 
not seeking to answer that question in this paper, we recognize that asking it is a challenge to 
common assumptions about subjective experience. “Hermeneutics is the theory that the distinc-
tion between facts and interpretation bears closer scrutiny…no matter how loudly you proclaim 
you are just sticking to the facts, you are only raising the volume of your own interpretations” 
(Caputo, 2018, p. 4). Caputo’s words, here, remind us that subjectivity—the experience of self—
is nested within and among our action in the world. Human subjectivity informs our simple 
choice of what to eat for breakfast; it also informs the uptake of objectivist and constructionist 
thought.  
 
Subjectivity is contentious because, in neoliberal, instrumentalist contexts (such as the profes-
sions), singular, subjective experience is perceived as lacking validity as a source of truth.   
Subjectivity is, though, a form of becoming. For some theorists, like Marcuse, subjectivity is the 
cultivation of radical, resistive subjectivities. In this way, subjective is not just “is,” but is 
shifting, and always forthcoming: a rich site for inquiry. 
 
Take, also, ideas like bildung – the education within and through culture. Bildung makes subjec-
tivity more than simple opinion or the way the “other” sees it. Subjectivity can be owned and 
named, we can articulate a self that engages with, and appraises, a world, just as others are at 
liberty and able to critique the existence of that self. The transaction here implies something 
beyond subjective opinion, but rather a negotiation of self, knowledge, and understanding 
between self and world. These conversations are not expressions of a solely subjective state, but 
an applied debate in which ontological and epistemological tensions are played out in both 
generative and constraining ways.  
 
When considering how it is, as people in the world, that we know, even apparently “subjective” 
judgments are problematic. Taste, for example, is an aesthetic consideration. Taste is the subjec-
tive experience of pleasure or displeasure; a person either likes something or they do not. People 
are, however, also conditioned to find some things pleasurable (a nice latte for example), and 
other things displeasing (like the smell of durian). The actual physical or physiological response 
of the body to certain stimuli is precisely that, a biological response that might contribute to a 
sense of subjectivity, but biology is not subjectivity in and of itself. The fact that around 10% of 
the population possess a gene that makes cilantro taste like soap is not a singular truth grounded 
in either objectivity (10% have the gene) or subjectivity (the experience and appraisal of cilantro 
is a negative one). Therefore, an exploration of the nature and conditions of pleasure is needed in 
order to explore human experience. The exploration and the finding transcend the limits of 
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subjectivity as it is commonly understood. One might argue that the limits of science are similar-
ly transcended in such a venture.  
 
The arguments that things (like findings in qualitative research) are “subjective” are based on 
superficial engagement with what subjectivity means. Even if a singular person can be known as 
a subject with subjective experiences, it cannot by extension just be assumed that what a person 
says or otherwise expresses, or how they act, is subjective. For some theorists (consider psycho-
analytic feminism, for example), subjectivity is always constituted. That is to say, it is of some-
thing and that something cannot be ignored, reducing subjectivity to a matter of taste, preference, 
or disconnected independence of mind over context. 
 
Finally, the boundaries of subjectivity are cultural: the degree to which we experience ourselves 
as subjective entities is not stable across culture or context. As a result, the reducing of complex 
expressions of being or presence in the world, as well the meaning-making practices in which 
people engage, to opinion or anecdote is both naïve and a loss of potential to enrich how connec-
tions are made between people in their respective worlds. 
 
This editorial is about personal accounts of interwoven universal human experiences of loss, 
mortality, and grief. Though one writes within the “limit situation” (George, 2017), the writing 
can be interpretively linked to the world – a world which is not purely “my own” but intersects 
others’ experiences so that it becomes recognizable and, in that sense, communal. This is at the 
heart of hermeneutics: a sense of recognizability and kinship. George’s (2017) beautiful article 
was in response to Beamer’s (2017) and Moules (2017) reflections of grief and loss but it was 
also about his experience of the loss of his father. This editorial is continuing the conversation. In 
hermeneutics, one’s experience is often a point of departure either as something to interpret or 
something that changes our interpretation of things (K. Sweet, personal communication, July 25, 
2018).  
 
In continuing this conversation of loss, mortality, and grief, Moules takes on the experience of 
dementia and the limit situation of memory in the context of dementia. In watching someone 
experience dementia, there are moments of connection, lucidity, and recall, watching as things 
become altered (at best), attacked, and finally lost. As Moules’ mother succumbs to the dementia 
that has claimed and robbed her, we are clearly aware that dementia is not suffered in the singu-
lar. Moules, too, is suffering its claim and its theft of her mother and this experience is much 
more than “just subjective.” “If we truly understand what an interpretation is – which is what we 
do in hermeneutics – we would never say ‘just a matter of interpretation’” (Caputo, 2018, p. 14). 
 
The Other Side of Dementia 
 
I (Moules) am watching my mother die. This is hard but not as hard as it is to watch her suffering 
in her dying – a suffering that dementia has imposed. I lose her over and over again every day. 
Rarely now are there glimpses of my mom. I look deep into her eyes and cannot find her and she 
cannot find me either - - a deeper sorrow and suffering for her - a deeper loss.  
 
Dying is not such a bad thing. Suffering is. 
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George (2017) reminded us of the limit situation of memory in grieving and I watch the betrayal 
of memory as dementia, against our will, robs her of her fight to hold on to what and who she 
knows, just as she knows she is losing all of it.  
 
There is a past that is being lost here, not just her past but my own as well, a past connected to 
others in our lives. I wrote the following in 2009 for my mother and her two sisters, as well as for 
my cousins. I read it at the funeral of my mom's eldest sister in 2010. 
 
Our Mothers’ Kitchen Tables 
 
We grew up lingering around the tables in our mothers’ kitchens.  
 
In our times together as families, our mothers, three sisters, cooked for us all, and then gathered 
together in the kitchen to do the dishes; Simply a disguise to mark the work that had to be done… 
But really claiming the place where they could connect alone.  
 
I remember us as kids, hanging around, not really helping, but mostly wanting to catch a scent of 
something secret.  
 
In these curiously sacred, yet mundane times, we learned from our mothers how to move seam-
lessly from laughter to tears, teasing to supporting, listening to telling. We learned what it is to 
be connected, to be loyal to family.  
 
We learned how to love. 
 
We hung around hoping to catch a tidbit of gossip, a nuance of sex, a glimpse at the laughter 
that transformed their lives from minutia to perfection.  
 
But mostly we stayed to see who we would become, what we had waiting for us. We stayed to see 
the almost inexplicable moments when they were just themselves in a way with each other that no 
one else knew.  In these moments, they were not mothers or wives. 
 
They were sisters. 
 
We grew up lingering around our mothers in the moments when they moved from being mothers 
to girls; to women who, over years of experiences and love and loss, still found something to 
laugh about. 
 
We grew up with the hope that we too would find tables that were strong enough to hold up such 
rich history and grounding trust that laugher would always be found, that teasing meant love, 
and that family is heart. 
 
We were well-fed at our mothers’ kitchen tables. 
 
My mom was able to attend that funeral and then she had the 5th of surgeries for her pituitary 
tumour – a craniotomy this time. I started to lose her then. Dementia is a master thief; it is 
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stealthy at times, bold at others. It slips in quietly and proclaims itself loudly. This kind of 
insidious loss does not happen cleanly, and the tables begin to turn at some point. 
 
Resetting the Kitchen Table 
 
The table has changed - -  
 She can’t see it. 
 He can’t hear it. 
She is no longer the person 
she thought she was 
and then she believes she has lost me as well as herself. 
 
I have to dig deep to find her. 
But there are moments when she shows… 
I make a random joke and she gets it.  
He doesn’t. 
 
The food gets worse; the meal is harder; there is less laughter. 
 
And I leave to come back to my own home realizing I miss her. 
And once again, see nuances and foreshadowing of what I am to become 
- - the set table that awaits me. 
 
My father died last year (Moules, 2017), and my mother did well enough on her own until 
January 2018. Then quickly it was Long Term Care and a very rapid decline deep into dementia, 
such that she can no longer talk and she is receiving total nursing care. She knows who I am, but 
it is a limit situation of memory that has betrayed her and left me bereft before she has died. She 
is dying and I try to grasp George’s (2017) limit situation that Gadamer invokes - it give me 
comfort in his words of memories that are “inexhaustible in their significance” (p. 3), and how I 
am charged to carry the memory on my own: “The world is gone; I must carry you” (Derrida, 
2005, p. 141, citing Paul Celan).  
 
I think too of my friend, Heather, who lost her daughter, Danielle, last year on September 26, and 
my other friend, Janice, who lost her son, Jordan, last year on December 1, and the memories 
they carry of worlds gone. “The infinite task posed by the dead” (George, 2017, p. 1) is as 
limitless as are our efforts to understand (Gadamer, 1960/2003). 
 
Grief, like life, involves a radical and resistive subjectivity (Sebba, 2012). Grief is not just 
sadness, but sometimes it is relief; there is freedom with loss; there is laughter with tears, or as 
Crist suggested “As soon as a newborn child feels the first touch of air it falls to crying. The sun 
must shine upon it for well nigh forty days before it starts to laugh. Oh in this world, tears 
predominate over laughter” (Crist, 2018, pp. 7-8, citing Gadamer, 1996, p, 153, citing the poetry 
of Friedrich von Logau). During her life, my mother resisted being “the good minister’s wife.” 
She was, at times subversive and, for a woman of her time she may have been thought of as 
radical, albeit quietly and with careful purpose. Recently, I have come to understand that even 
had she not resisted being the good minister’s wife, she could not have laid claim to such an 
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experience; some of the women of my father’s church can still not let go of their story of her as 
an unfitting minister’s wife. As her memories fail, my mother occupies a different resistive and 
radical subjectivity: she is the “I” without an “I.” This is not a simple subjectivity; it is being, 
becoming, resisting, and, ultimately, succumbing. 
 
We can set the loveliest of tables and we can invite the most loved of guests, but we cannot 
predict how well the meal will go - we can only do the best setting we can as we carve out the 
futures for which we can only hope. 
 
Postscript 
 
Thelma Irene Moules died at 1215 a.m., September 1, 2018. We miss her. 
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